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Abstract
It has recently been shown that if feedback effects
of decisions are ignored, then imposing fairness
constraints such as demographic parity or equality
of opportunity can actually exacerbate unfairness.
We propose to address this challenge by modeling
feedback effects as the dynamics of a Markov de-
cision processes (MDPs). First, we define analogs
of fairness properties that have been proposed for
supervised learning. Second, we propose algo-
rithms for learning fair decision-making policies
for MDPs. We also explore extensions to rein-
forcement learning, where parts of the dynamical
system are unknown and must be learned with-
out violating fairness. Finally, we demonstrate
the need to account for dynamical effects using
simulations on a loan applicant MDP.
1. Introduction
Machine learning has the potential to substantially improve
performance in legal and financial decision-making. How-
ever, it has been demonstrated that biases in the data can
be reflected in a decision-making policy trained on that
data (Dwork et al., 2012), which can result in decisions
that unfairly discriminate against minorities. For example,
consider the problem of giving loans to applicants (Hardt
et al., 2016). If minorities are historically given loans less
frequently, then there may be less data on how reliably they
repay loans. Thus, a learned decision-making policy may
unfairly label minorities as higher risk and deny them loans.
There have been several candidate definitions of fairness,
including demographic parity (i.e., members of the majority
and miniority subpopulations must on average have equal
outcomes) (Calders et al., 2009), equality of opportunity
(i.e., qualified members must on average have equal out-
comes) (Hardt et al., 2016), and causal fairness (i.e., pro-
tected attributes should not influence outcomes) (Kusner
et al., 2017; Kilbertus et al., 2017; Nabi & Shpitser, 2018).
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The appropriate definition depends on the application.
So far, work on fairness has focused on supervised learning.
However, it has recently been shown that naı¨vely imposing
fairness constraints while ignoring even one-step feedback
effects can actually harm minorities (Liu et al., 2018). Thus,
it is critical that we extend existing definitions of fairness to
account for the feedback effects of the decisions being made
on members of the population. For example, denying loans
to individuals may have consequences on their financial
security that need be taken into account.
This paper proposes algorithms for learning fair decision-
making policies that account for feedback effects of deci-
sions. We model these effects as the dynamics of a Markov
decision process (MDP), and extend existing fairness defini-
tions to decision-making policies for a known MDP. Unlike
supervised learning, we distinguish the quality of outcomes
for the decision-maker (e.g., the bank) from the quality of
the outcomes for individuals (e.g., a loan applicant). Then,
fairness properties are constraints on the average quality of
outcomes for individuals in different subpopulations (e.g.,
majorities and minorities are offered loans at the same fre-
quency), whereas the reward measures the quality of out-
comes for the decision-maker (e.g., the bank’s profit).
The key challenge is that learning with a fairness constraint
is much more challenging in the MDP setting due to the
inherent non-convexity—indeed, constrained reinforcement
learning is an active research area (Altman, 1999; Achiam
et al., 2017; Wen & Topcu, 2018; Bastani et al., 2018).
Building on this work, we propose both model-based (Alt-
man, 1999) and model-free (Wen & Topcu, 2018) algorithms
for learning policies that satisfy fairness constraints. We
initially assume the dynamics are known, but propose exten-
sions to settings where parts of the dynamics are unknown.
Prior work has studied one-step feedback effects (Liu et al.,
2018), but do not propose fair learning algorithms. For
learning unknown dynamics, prior work has focused on ban-
dit settings with specific fairness constraints (Joseph et al.,
2016; Hashimoto et al., 2018). There has been work on
learning unknown dynamics in MDPs (Jabbari et al., 2017;
Elzayn et al., 2019), but for a specific fairness contraint. Fur-
thermore, for their constraint, the optimal policy is always
fair. Thus, unlike our setting, solving for the optimal fair
policy is trivial once the dynamics are known.
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We compare to two baselines that ignore dynamics: (i) an
algorithm that optimistically pretends that actions do not af-
fect the state distribution (i.e., supervised learning), and (ii)
an algorithm that conservatively assumes the state distribu-
tion can change adversarially on each step. In a simulation
study on a loan applicant MDP based on (Hardt et al., 2016),
we show that compared to our algorithm, the optimistic
algorithm learns unfair policies, and the conservative algo-
rithm learns fair but poorly performing policies. Our results
demonstrate the importance of accounting for dynamics.
2. Problem Formulation
Markov decision processes. A Markov decision process
(MDP) is a tupleM = (S,A,D, P,R, γ), where S = [n] =
{1, ..., n} are the states, A = [m] are the actions, D ∈ R|S|
is the initial state distribution (i.e., Ds is the probability
of starting in state s), P ∈ R|S|×|A|×|S| are the transitions
(i.e., Ps,a,s′ is the probability of transitioning from state
s to state s′ when taking action a), R ∈ R|S|×|A| are the
rewards (i.e., Rs,a is the reward obtained taking action a in
state s), and γ ∈ R is the discount factor. Given a stochastic
policy pi ∈ R|S|×|A| (i.e., pis,a is the probability of taking
action a in state s), the induced state transtion probabilities
are P (pi) ∈ R|S|×|S|, where
P
(pi)
s,s′ =
∑
a∈A
pis,aPs,a,s′ ,
the induced distribution over states at time t is
D(pi,t) =
{
D if t = 0
P (pi)D(pi,t−1) otherwise,
and the time-discounted overall distribution over states is
D(pi) = (1− γ)
∞∑
t=0
γtD(pi,t) = (1− γ)
∞∑
t=0
(γP (pi))tD.
Then, the time-discounted overall distribution over state-
action pairs is Λ ∈ R|S|×|A|, where
Λ(pi)s,a = D
(pi)
s pis,a,
and the expected cumulative reward is
R(pi) = (1− γ)−1〈R,Λ(pi)〉,
where 〈X,Y 〉 = ∑s∈S∑a∈AXs,aYs,a. Given a policy
class Π, the optimal policy is pi∗ = arg maxpi∈ΠR
(pi).
Example. We describe an MDP Mloan that models indi-
viduals applying for loans. We assume each individual
has a true probability p of repaying their loan. On step
t, the bank has a prior on p (e.g., a credit score); for sim-
plicity, we assume this prior is a Beta distribution—i.e.,
pt ∼ Beta(αt, βt). Thus, the states of our MDP (αt, βt). 1
The actions are to offer (a = 1) or deny (a = 0) a loan. If
the bank offers a loan, the transitions are
(αt+1, βt+1) =
{
(αt + 1, βt) with probability p
(αt, βt+1) with probability 1− p.
If the bank denies the loan, then mathematically, the param-
eters of the posterior are (αt+1, βt+1) = (αt, βt). However,
since we are interested in detrimental effects of the bank’s
decisions, we consider the possibility that this decision re-
duces the applicant’s ability to pay for future loans:
(αt+1, βt+1) = (αt, βt + τ),
for some τ ∈ R+—e.g., if a loan is denied, the applicant
may resort to more expensive loans, thus reducing their
wealth. We assume the initial state distribution is z ∼
Bernoulli(pZ) and (α, β) ∼ p0(α, β | z) for some pZ ∈
[0, 1] and some distribution p0. The bank’s rewards are
Eδ[δI − (1− δ)P ]− λ
√
Varδ[δI − (1− δ)P ], (1)
where P is the principal (without loss of generality, we
let P = 1), I is interest, δ indicates whether the loan is
repaid, and λ ∈ R+. The first term is expected profit, and
the second term is to avoid risk. We assume that the bank
makes decisions with the goal of maximizing (1).
The fairness constraint refers to the rewards for individuals,
which we call agent rewards. In our example, the agent
rewards are I[a = 1], where I is the indicator function—i.e.,
a positive outcome is when the individual is offered a loan.
Fairness. Consider a population of individuals (e.g.,
loan applicants) interacting with a decision-maker (e.g., a
bank) (Hardt et al., 2016). States S encode an individ-
ual’s features (e.g., probability of repaying a loan), actions
A are interventions (e.g., loan offer), and transitions P
encode state changes (e.g., changes in ability to repay).
We use rewards R to indicate quality of outcomes for the
decision-maker (e.g., the bank’s profit), and use agent re-
wards ρ ∈ R|S|×|A| to indicate quality of outcomes for an
individual (e.g., whether a loan is offered).
Our goal is to learn the optimal policy for the decision-
maker under a fairness constraint. In particular, we want
to ensure that pi does not favor the majority subpopulation
over the minority subpopulation. We assume the state space
has the form S = S˜ × Z, where Z = {maj,min} encodes
whether an individual (s˜, z) ∈ S is from the majority (z =
maj) or minority (z = min) subpopulation, and S˜ encodes
non-sensitive individual characteristics (e.g., probability of
repaying a loan). We base our constraints on those for
supervised learning (Hardt et al., 2016).
1Technically, our MDP is the belief MDP of the POMDP where
the state p is unobserved.
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Definition 2.1. Let M be an MDP with state space of the
form S = Z × S˜, where Z = {maj,min}, and let ρ ∈
R|S|×|A| be the agent rewards. Then, a policy pi satisfies
demographic parity if
E
(s,a)∼Λ(pi)maj
[ρs,a] = E(s,a)∼Λ(pi)min [ρs,a],
where Λ(pi)z = Λ(pi) | ∃s˜ ∈ S˜ . s0 = (z, s˜) for z ∈ Z—i.e.,
(Λ(pi)z )s,a = (D
(pi)
z )spis,a (∀s ∈ S, a ∈ A)
(D(pi)z )s = (1− γ)
∞∑
t=0
(γP (pi))tDz (∀s ∈ S)
(Dz)s0 ∝ Ds0 · I[∃s˜ ∈ S˜ . s0 = (z, s˜)] (∀s0 ∈ S).
That is, Λ(pi)z is Λ(pi) conditioned on the initial state s0 being
of the form s0 = (z, s˜0) for some s˜0 ∈ S˜, and demographic
parity says that the cumulative agent rewards are equal on
average for the majority and minority subpopulations. For
Mloan, demographic parity says that loans should be given
to majority and minority members with equal frequency.
Our goal is to compute the optimal policy for the policy
class ΠDP of policies that satisfy demographic parity:
pi∗ = arg max
pi∈ΠDP
R(pi). (2)
Remark 2.2. We focus on demographic parity, but the tech-
niques we develop are general. In particular, they apply
to any fairness constraint saying that two subpopulations
should have equal outcomes on average—i.e., for any set of
subsets Sz ⊆ S for each z ∈ Z, letting
Λ˜(pi)z = Λ˜
(pi) | I[s0 ∈ Sz],
then we can handle the fairness constraint
E
(s,a)∼Λ˜(pi)maj
[ρs,a] = E(s,a)∼Λ˜(pi)min [ρs,a].
For example, our techniques also apply to equality of op-
portunity (Hardt et al., 2016) and path-specific causal fair-
ness (Nabi & Shpitser, 2018); see Appendix A.
Remark 2.3. We sometimes consider a fairness with an 
tolerance (for some  ∈ R+):∣∣E
(s,a)∼Λ(pi)maj
[ρs,a]− E(s,a)∼Λ(pi)min [ρs,a]
∣∣ ≤ . (3)
We let ΠDP, denote the policies satisfying (3).
Remark 2.4. We consider two subpopulations for simplic-
ity; our techniques extend to multiple subpopulations.
Existence and determinism. We briefly discuss the exis-
tence of deterministic solutions to (2). Unconstrained MDPs
always have a deterministic optimal policy (Sutton & Barto,
2018). With a fairness constraint, this result no longer holds:
Theorem 2.5. There exists an MDP such that ΠDP = ∅.
There exists an MDP such that pi∗ in (2) is not deterministic.
We give a proof in Appendix B. For the following special
case, we can prove existence of fair policies:
Definition 2.6. The agent rewards are state-independent if
ρs,a = ρ˜a for all s ∈ S and for some ρ˜ ∈ R|A|.
Intuitively, this property captures settings where the
decision-maker uses the state to choose actions (e.g., ability
to repay), but the outcomes for the individuals only depend
on whether the preferred action is taken (e.g., a loan offer).
Our example Mloan has state-independent agent rewards.
Theorem 2.7. If the agent rewards are state-independent,
then (2) has a solution.
Proof. Clearly, any policy pi such that pis,a = p˜ia for all
s ∈ S and some p˜i ∈ R|A|, satisfies pi ∈ ΠDP.
3. Model-Based Algorithm
We describe a model-based algorithm for solving (2), which
has strong theoretical guarantees (i.e., it solves (2) exactly
in polynomial time). On the other hand, it makes strong
assumptions—i.e., that M has finite state and action spaces,
and furthermore satisfies a separability property saying that
the sensitive attribute z ∈ Z does not change over time:
Definition 3.1. An MDP with states S = Z × S˜ is separa-
ble if the transitions satisfy P(z,s˜),a,(z′,s˜′) = δz,z′ P˜s˜,a,s˜′ ,
where δz,z′ = I[z = z′] is the Kronecker delta and
P˜ ∈ R|S˜|×|A|×|S˜| is a transition matrix.
That is, the transitions do not affect z. This property is
satisfied by many sensitive attributes (e.g., race and gender).
Background. When the policy class Π is unconstrained,
then the optimal policy is deterministic, and can be ex-
pressed as the function
pi∗(s) = arg max
a∈A
(
Rs,a + γ
∑
s′∈S
Ps,a,s′V
∗
s′
)
where the value function V ∗ ∈ R|S| is the unique solution
to the Bellman equation (Sutton & Barto, 2018):
V ∗s = max
a∈A
{
Rs,a + γ
∑
s′∈S
Ps,a,s′V
∗
s′
}
. (4)
Furthermore, V ∗ is the solution to the following linear pro-
gram (LP) (Sutton & Barto, 2018):
arg min
V ∈R|S|
〈D,V 〉 (5)
subj. to Vs ≥ Rs,a + γ
∑
s′∈S
Ps,a,s′Vs′ (∀s ∈ S, a ∈ A).
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Algorithm 1 Model-based algorithm.
Input: Separable MDP M
Compute the solution λ∗, c∗ to the linear program
arg max
λ∈R|S|×|A|,c∈R
(1− γ)−1
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
λs,aRs,a
subj. to
∑
a∈A
λs′,a = (1− γ)Ds′ + γ
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
λs,aPs,a,s′
(∀s′ ∈ S)
p−1z
∑
s˜∈S˜
∑
a∈A
λ(z,s˜),aρ(z,s˜),a = c (∀z ∈ Z)
Output: Policy pi∗s,a =
λ∗s,a∑
a′∈A λ
∗
s,a′
Algorithm. When we require that pi ∈ ΠDP, then the Bell-
man equation (4) may no longer hold. Thus, if we add this
constraint to (5), then (5) may become unsatisfiable. Instead,
our approach is based on the dual of (5) (Altman, 1999). In
particular, the objective and first set of constraints of the LP
in Algorithm 1 form the dual. 2
The last set of constraints in the LP in Algorithm 1 en-
codes demographic parity. These constraints exploit the
separable structure of the underlying MDP. In particular, the
component z of an initial state s = (z, s˜) does not change
over time, so the value of z for s equals the value of z for
the initial state s0 ∼ D. Thus, randomly sampling a state
s ∼ D(pi)z is equivalent to randomly sampling
s ∼ D(pi) | ∃s˜ ∈ S˜ . s = (z, s˜).
Expanding the conditional probability, the probability of
sampling s ∼ D(pi)z is
D
(pi)
s I[∃s˜ ∈ S˜ . s = (z, s˜)]
pz
, where pz =
∑
s˜∈S˜
D(z,s˜).
It follows that
E
(s,a)∼Λ(pi)z [ρs,a] = p
−1
z
∑
s˜∈S˜
∑
a∈A
λ(z,s˜),aρs,a. (6)
The last set of constraints in the LP in Algorithm 1 uses (6)
to encode demographic parity.
Theorem 3.2. Given a separable MDP M , Algorithm 1 a
solution pi∗ to (2) if and only if (2) is satisfiable.
We give a proof in Appendix C. Since we can solve an LP
in polynomial time, Algorithm 1 runs in polynomial time.
2Some variables are rescaled compared to the actual dual.
4. Model-Free Algorithm
Our model-based algorithm makes strong assumptions about
the given MDP—i.e., separability and finite state and action
spaces. We propose a model-free algorithm for solving (2)
that relaxes all these assumptions. Our algorithm learns
policies that satisfy demographic parity with an  tolerance—
i.e., the set of policies ΠDP,. We need this tolerance since
our model-free algorithm can only estimate the agent re-
wards ρ. Then, our algorithm is based on formulating (2) as
the following optimization problem:
arg max
pi∈Π,c∈R
R(pi) subj. to |ρ(pi)maj − ρ(pi)min| ≤ , (7)
where ρ(pi)z = E(s,a)∼Λ(pi)z [ρ]. Note that this optimization
problem is non-convex. Thus, unlike our model-based algo-
rithm, this algorithm may converge to a local optimum.
Background. Our algorithm relies on the cross-entropy
(CE) method (Mannor et al., 2003; Hu et al., 2012), which is
a general heuristic for solving optimization problems. Sup-
pose our policies piθ ∈ Π are parameterized by θ ∈ Θ, and
let a family F of probability distributions over Θ parameter-
ized by V ⊆ Rd. In general, we use θ and piθ interchange-
ably, e.g., R(θ) = R(piθ). In the unconstrained setting, CE
aims to solve the following optimization problem:
v∗ = arg max
v∈V
Ev[R(θ)], (8)
where we have used the notation Ev = Eθ∼fv . In other
words, it aims to compute a distribution fv∗ that places high
probability mass on θ with high expected cumulative reward
R(θ). Then, it returns a sample θ ∼ fv∗ .
To solve (8), CE starts with initial parameters v0 ∈ V . Then,
on each iteration, it updates the current parameters vk to
move “closer” to v∗. More precisely, the update is
vk+1 = arg max
v∈V
DKL(gk+1 ‖ fv) (9)
gk+1(θ
′) = α
R(θ
′)I[R(θ′) ≥ γk]fvk(θ′)
Evk [R(θ)I[R(θ) ≥ γk]]
+ (1− α)fvk(θ′)
where γk satisfies Prvk [R
(θ) ≥ γi] = µ. Here, α, µ ∈
(0, 1) are hyperparameters. Intuitively, the first term of gi
upweights θ′ with large values of R(θ
′) compared to fvk ,
both by directly weighting the probability of θ′ by R(θ
′),
and furthermore by placing zero probability mass on the
bottom 1− µ fraction of the θ′. The second term of gk is a
“smoothing” term that makes the update incremental.
To enable efficient optimization of (9), we assume that F is
a (natural) exponential family.
Definition 4.1. A family F of distributions over Θ ⊆ Rd
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is an exponential family if, for a continuous Γ : Θ→ Rd,
fv(θ) =
1
Z(θ)
ev
>Γ(θ) where Z(θ) =
∫
ev
>Γ(θ)dθ.
In this case, it can be shown that (Hu et al., 2012)
vk+1 = m
−1(ηk+1) (10)
ηk+1 = α
Evk [R(θ)I[R(θ) ≥ γk]Γ(θ)]
Evk [R(θ)I[R(θ) ≥ γk]]
+ (1− α)ηk
where m(v) = Ev[Γ(θ)] is the moment map.
The CE algorithm approximates (10) by sampling rollouts
ζ = ((s0, a0), ..., (sT−1, aT−1)) of length T according to
policy piθ. Then, it computes estimate Rˆ(θ) ≈ R(θ), where
Rˆ(θ) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
Rˆ(ζ(i)) where Rˆ(ζ) =
T−1∑
t=0
γtRst,at ,
and where ζ(1), ..., ζ(m) are m sampled rollouts.
To estimate ηk+1, it takes n samples θ(1), ..., θ(n) ∼ fv and
computes Rˆ(θ
(i)) for each i ∈ [n]. It then ranks the θ(i)
in decreasing order of Rˆ(θ
(i)), and discards all but the top
n′ = dnµe. Now, it estimates the numerator in ηk+1 as
Evk [R(θ)I[R(θ) ≥ γk]Γ(θ)] ≈
1
n
n′∑
i=1
Rˆ(θ
(i))Γ(θ(i)).
The denominator in ηk+1 is estimated similarly.
Algorithm 2 computes this estimate of the update (10) as-
suming the condition on Line 11 is satisfied (as we discuss
below, the check is needed to enforce the constraint in (7)).
Line 6 of Algorithm 2 computes the estimates Rˆ(θ
(i)) for
samples θ(i) ∼ fvk for i ∈ [n], and Line 14 estimates ηk+1.
On Line 6 & 7, the notation ∼m←−− means to estimate using
m samples (in this case, rollouts ζ(1), ..., ζ(m)).
Finally, we use a constrained cross-entropy (CCE) method,
which extends CE to handle constraints (Wen & Topcu,
2018). Intuitively, CCE prioritizes policies where the con-
straint in (7) is closer to holding, unless the constraint holds,
in which case CCE prioritizes policies with higher expected
cumulative reward. In particular, Algorithm 2 imposes this
constraint by checking if a sufficient fraction of the θ sat-
isfies the constraint ˆ(θ) ≤  in Line 11, where ˆ(θ) is esti-
mated from samples. As discussed below, ˜ is used in place
of  to enforce the constraint even though ˆ(θ) is inexact.
Algorithm. A key challenge to applying CCE is that it
relies on estimates ˆ(pi) of (pi). These estimates are inexact
for two reasons: (i) they are estimated from samples, and (ii)
they are estimated based on a finite time horizon (whereas
Algorithm 2 Model-free algorithm.
1: Input: MDP M , Iters r, Parameter samples n, Top n′,
Rollout samples m, Smoothing α, Tolerance σ
2: ηˆ ← ~0
3: for k ∈ [1, ..., r] do
4: Sample θ(1), ..., θ(n) ∼ fm−1(ηˆ)
5: for i ∈ [1, ..., n] do
6: Rˆ(θ
(i)) ∼m←−− R(θ(i))
7: ˆ(θ
(i)) ∼m←−− |ρ(θ(i))maj − ρ(θ
(i))
min |
8: end for
9: Sort {θ(i)}ni=1 in increasing ˆ(θ
(i))
10: i′ ← Largest i such that ˆ(θ(i)) ≤ (1− σ)
11: if n′ ≤ i′ then
12: Sort {θ(i)}i′i=1 in decreasing Rˆ(θ
(i))
13: end if
14: ηˆ ← α · 1n
∑n′
i=1 Rˆ
(θ(i))Γ(θ(i))
1
n
∑n′
i=1 Rˆ
(θ(i))
+ (1− α) · ηˆ
15: end for
16: Output: Policy piθˆ, where θˆ ∼ fm−1(ηˆ)
(pi) is defined for an infinite time horizon). To account for
this error, we use (1− σ) (where σ ∈ (0, 1)) in place of 
when checking the constraint on Line 11 of Algorithm 2.
We provide two guarantees for Algorithm 2. First, the errors
in (i) estimating whether (pi) ≤  and (ii) estiamting R(pi)
can be made arbitrarily small by making m and T large.
Theorem 4.2. Assume that Rmax be an upper bound on
R (i.e., ‖R‖∞ = Rmax) and on ρ. Let δ ∈ R+ and σ ∈
(0, 1/2] be given, and suppose that
m ≥ 32Rmax(1− γ) log(6/δ)
σ22
T ≥ log 4Rmax
σ2(1− γ) .
Then, for any pi, with probability at least 1− δ, we have
(ˆ(pi) ≤ ˜)⇒ (pi ∈ ΠDP,)
where ˜ = (1− σ), and
|R(pi) − Rˆ(pi)| ≤ σ
2
.
Note that Rˆ(pi) and ρˆ(pi)z (for each z ∈ Z) must be estimated
with independently sampled rollouts.
Second, we assume that Algorithm 2 solves the problem
truncated to T steps exactly, and then consider how the
solution compares to the untruncated problem (7).
Theorem 4.3. Assume that Rmax is an upper bound on R
(i.e., ‖R‖∞ = Rmax) and on ρ. Let σ ∈ (0, 1/2] be given,
and suppose that T is as in Theorem 4.2, and let
pi∗ = arg max
pi∈ΠDP,(1−σ)2
R(pi) and p˜i∗ = arg max
pi∈Π˜DP,(1−σ)
R˜(pi),
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where R˜(pi) =
∑T−1
t=0 γ
t〈R,Λ(pi,t)〉 is truncated to T steps,
similarly ρ˜(pi)z =
∑T−1
t=0 γ
t〈R,Λ(pi,t)z 〉, and Π˜DP,˜ is the set
of pi satisfying |ρ˜(pi)maj − ρ˜(pi)min | ≤ ˜. Then, p˜i∗ ∈ ΠDP,, and
|R(pi∗) −R(p˜i∗)| ≤ σ
2
2
.
We give proofs for both theorems in Appendix D. Note that
in Theorem 4.3, we have restricted (7) to guarantee fairness
with tolerance (1 − σ)2 instead of . This restriction is
needed since Algorithm 2 must be conservative to ensure
that the error due to the truncation error. This gap can be
made arbitrarily small by taking σ sufficiently small.
5. Fairness Ignoring Dynamics
To demonstrate the importance of accounting for dynam-
ics, we compare to two baseline algorithms that ignore dy-
namics when constraining fairness. More precisely, these
algorithms solve an optimization problem of the form
pi∗ = arg max
pi∈Π0DP
R(pi),
where Π0DP does not take into account the MDP dynamics—
i.e., Π0DP does not account for how actions affect the distribu-
tion of states D(pi,t) at future time steps t > 0. We consider
two algorithms, each using a different choice of Π0DP.
The first algorithm optimistically pretends that actions do
not affect the state distribution—i.e.,D(pi,t) does not change
over time. This captures the supervised learning setting.
Compared to our algorithm, this algorithm may learn a
policy that is unfair but achieves higher reward.
The second algorithm conservatively assumes D(pi,t) can
change arbitrarily on each step. Like our algorithm, this one
learns a fair policy, but it may achieve much lower reward.
Optimistic assumptions. We can optimistically assume
that the state distribution does not change over time, i.e.,
D(pi,t) = D (∀t > 0). (11)
Given this assumption, the time-discounted distribution over
states equals D regardless of the policy pi—i.e., D(pi) = D
for any pi. Then, we can let pi∗ be the solution to
arg max
pi∈Π,c∈R
R(pi) (12)
subj. to Es∼Dz
[∑
a∈A
pis,aρs,a
]
= c (∀z ∈ Z),
where Dz = D | ∃s˜ ∈ S˜ . s0 = (z, s˜). We can solve (12)
using a straightforward modification of Algorithm 2.
Theorem 5.1. Assuming that (11) holds for the MDP M ,
then the solution of (12) is a solution to (2).
This theorem follows straightforwardly—in particular, the
objective in (12) is the same as that in (2), and if (11) holds,
then the constraint in (12) is equivalent to the demographic
parity constraint. Of course, if (11) fails to hold, then we
cannot provide any guarantees about pi∗.
Conservative assumptions. We can conservatively as-
sume that D(pi,t) for every t can be arbitrary, and to con-
servatively require that demographic parity holds for every
possible sequence D(pi,t). We focus on finite S. Then, we
restrict to policies pi that satisfy
Es∼D′maj
[∑
a∈A
pis,aρs,a
]
= Es∼D′min
[∑
a∈A
pis,aρs,a
]
(13)
(∀D′ ∈ ∆|S|),
where D′z = D
′ | ∃s˜ ∈ S˜ . s = (z, s˜), and ∆n is the
standard n-simplex. Note that D′z is conditioned on s =
(z, s˜) (i.e., the current state has sensitive attribute z) instead
of s0 = (z, s˜) (i.e., the initial state has sensitive attribute
z); if M is separable, these two conditions are equivalent.
Finally, note that D′z is undefined if the conditional has zero
probability according to D′; we implicitly omit such D′
from the universal quantification in (13).
The difficulty in enforcing (13) is handling the universal
quantification over D′ ∈ ∆|S|. In fact, we can equivalently
enforce that the one-step rewards are independent of the
state. Thus, we can solve the optimization problem
arg max
pi∈Π,c∈R
R(pi) (14)
subj. to
∑
a∈A
pis,aρs,a = c (∀s ∈ S).
We use pi0 to denote the solution to (14). When S is finite,
we can solve (14) using a modification of Algorithm 2;
however, to the best of our knowledge, the conservative
approach is in general intractable when S is continuous. We
have made conservative assumptions about D(pi,t), so the
solution to (14) satisfies demographic parity.
Theorem 5.2. The solution pi∗ of (14) satisfies pi∗ ∈ ΠDP.
We give a proof in Appendix E. Note that while the solution
pi∗ of (14) is guaranteed to satisfy demographic parity, it
may be suboptimal compared to taking into account the
dynamics in the fairness constraint.
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For separable M , (14) is equivalent to the LP
arg max
λ∈R|S|×|A|,c∈R|S|
(1− γ)−1
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
λs,aRs,a
subj. to
∑
a∈A
λs′,a = (1− γ)Ds′ + γ
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
λs,aPs,a,s′
(∀s′ ∈ S)∑
a∈A
λ(z,s˜),aρ(z,s˜),a = c (∀z ∈ Z, ∀s˜ ∈ S˜)
so we can return the policy pis,a = λs,a/
∑
a′∈A λs,a′ . The
proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.2.
6. Reinforcement Learning
We discuss extensions to the setting where parts of the MDP
are initially unknown, and the goal is to ensure fairness
while learning these quantities. The approaches we pro-
pose are naı¨ve, leaving room for future work. We consider
policies that satisfy demographic parity with an  tolerance—
i.e., the set of policies ΠDP,. Our proposed approaches rely
on the policy pi0 defined in (14), which is learned using
conservative assumptions about the MDP dynamics.
Unknown dynamics. We propose an approach to fairness
when the transitions P are unknown. Our goal is to en-
sure that with high probability, fairness holds for all time
including during learning. We consider the episodic case
where the system is reset after a fixed number of steps T ,
and take γ = 1. That is, a finite sequence of interactions
is performed repeatedly—e.g., each new loan applicant is
a new episode. We assume there are a fixed total number
of episodes N , and the goal is to perform well on average;
the doubling trick can be used to generalize to unknown or
unbounded N (see p. 99 of (Lattimore & Szepesva´ri)).
We use explore-then-commit (Lattimore & Szepesva´ri).
First, we explore using the conservative policy pi0 for N0
episodes. Then, we estimate P using the observed state-
action-state tuples (s, a, s′) (i.e., transition to s′ upon taking
action a in state s):
Pˆs,a,s′ =
# observed tuples (s, a, s′)
# observed tuples (s, a, s′′) for some s′′ ∈ S .
Finally, for the remainingN−N0, it uses the optimal policy
pˆi computed as if Pˆ is the true transition matrix.
We assume that pi0 explores all state-action pairs. In par-
ticular, let D(pi) = 1T
∑T−1
t=0 D
(pi,t) and Λ(pi)s,a = D
(pi)
s pis,a,
where D(pi,t) is defined as before. Then, we assume that
Λ(pi0)s,a ≥ λ0 > 0 (∀s ∈ S, a ∈ A)
for some constant λ0. We prove a bound on the regret
R(N) = E
[
N∑
n=1
R(pi
∗) −R(pin)
]
,
where the expectation is taken over the randomness of the
observed tuples (s, a, s′), pi∗ is the optimal policy for known
P that satisfies pi∗ ∈ ΠDP,/4, and
pin =
{
pi0 if n ≤ N0
pˆi otherwise
is the policy our algorithm uses on episode n. Furthermore,
we show that for a given δ ∈ R+, we have pin ∈ ΠDP, for
every n ∈ [N ] with probability at least 1− δ.
Theorem 6.1. Let , δ ∈ R+ be given. Assume that Rmax
be an upper bound on R (i.e., ‖R‖∞ = Rmax) and on ρ. Let
N0 =
128T 2 · |S|2 ·R2max · log(2|S|2|A|/δ)
λ20
2
.
Let Mˆ = (S,A,D, Pˆ , R, T ), and pˆi be the optimal policy
for Mˆ in ΠˆDP,/2 (i.e., the set of policies satisfying demo-
graphic parity for Mˆ ). Let M = (S,A,D, P,R, T ), and
pi∗ be optimal for M in ΠDP,/4. Then, pˆi ∈ ΠDP,, and
R(pi
∗) −R(pˆi) ≤ , where R(pi) is defined according to M .
We give a proof in Appendix G. Note that there is a gap
between the fairness constraint of pi∗ (which is in ΠDP,/4)
and that of pˆi (which is only in ΠDP,)—i.e., we can only
guarantee performance compared to a policy that satisfies a
stricter level of fairness. Choosing  = N−2/3, we have:
Corollary 6.2. For any δ ∈ R+, we have regret R(N) =
O(N2/3 log(1/δ)) with probability at least 1− δ.
Unknown initial distribution. Suppose that the initial
distribution D is unknown. We consider the non-episodic
setting—i.e., we cannot restart. In this setting, initially
use the conservative policy pi0, which is fair regardless of
D. Then, we can improve performance once the Markov
chain induced by pi0 is mixed—i.e., close to its stationary
distribution (Kearns & Singh, 2002; Even-Dar et al., 2005):
Definition 6.3. A policy pi is ergodic if there exists d(pi) ∈
∆|S| (the stationary distribution of pi) such that P (pi)d(pi) =
d(pi), and for all d ∈ ∆|S|, limt→∞(P (pi))td = d(pi). Given
ergodic pi and  ∈ R+, the  mixing time is T ∈ N such that
for all d ∈ ∆|S|, ‖(P (pi))T d− d(pi)‖∞ ≤ .
Let T0 be the 0 mixing time of pi0. While D(pi0,T0) is
unknown, we know that it satisfies
‖D(pi0,T0) − d(pi0)‖∞ ≤ 0.
Finally, we can run Algorithm 1 as if d(pi0) is the initial
distribution, to obtain a policy p˜i. As long as  is sufficiently
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Figure 1. Demographic parity (a) objective value, (b) constraint
value, and equal opportunity (c) objective value, (d) constraint
value, for race-blind (RB), demographic parity (DP) or equal op-
portunity (EO), optimistic (Opt), and conservative (Cons).
small, we can show that p˜i achieves reward close to the true
optimal policy pi∗ (with initial distribution D(pi0,T0)).
Theorem 6.4. Let  ∈ R+ be given. Assume that Rmax
upper bounds R (i.e., ‖R‖∞ = Rmax) and ρ, and that the
0 mixing time of pi0 is T0, where 0 =
(1−γ)
8|S|·Rmax . Let M˜ =
(S,A, d(pi0), P,R, γ), and let p˜i be the optimal policy for M˜
in Π˜DP,/2 (i.e., the set of policies satisfying demographic
parity for M˜ ). Similarly, let M = (S,A,D(pi0,T0), P,R, γ),
and let p˜i∗ be the optimal policy for M in ΠDP,/4. Then,
p˜i ∈ ΠDP,, and R(p˜i∗) − R(p˜i) ≤ , where R(pi) is defined
according to M .
We give a proof in Appendix F. In other words, we act
close to optimally once the Markov chain has mixed. How-
ever, Theorem 6.4 only bounds the reward compared to the
optimal policy p˜i∗ on D(pi0,T0). Ideally, we would bound
the reward compared to the optimal policy pi∗ trained with
known initial dynamics. However, even though we are act-
ing optimally after the first T0 steps, pi0 may have moved the
system into a suboptimal distribution D(pi0,T0) compared to
D(pi
∗,T0). Thus, we cannot prove such a bound.
Finally, as before, there is a gap between the fairness con-
straint of pi∗ (in ΠDP,/4) and that of pˆi (only in ΠDP,).
7. Experiments
MDP parameters. We run simulations using our loan
example from Section 2. We estimated parameters based
on FICO score data (Hardt et al., 2016). We consider the
majority subpopulation to be Whites, and the minority sub-
population to be Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. For the
initial distribution p0, we first fit parameters the parameters
of the prior Beta(αz, βz) based on the data. Then, we take a
fixed number of steps Tz using action a = 1 (i.e., offer loan)
to force exploration. We choose Tmaj > Tmin to capture
the idea that less data is available for minorities. We also
estimate the probability pZ of being a minority from the
data. Similar to (Hardt et al., 2016), we choose I so the
bank makes a profit on the average applicant. We manually
choose the remaining parameters λ, τ , Tmaj, and Tmin based
on intuition. We give exact parameter values in Appendix I.
Experimental setup. We ran Algorithm 2 to learn fair
policies for both the demographic parity and equal opportu-
nity constraints, using fairness threshold  = 0.1 (i.e., policy
classes ΠDP, and ΠEO,). For each constraint, we also use
the optimistic and conservative algorithms described in Sec-
tion 5. Note that the conservative algorithms we described
do not apply since our state space is infinite. However, since
our agent rewards are state-independent, the conservative
assumption is in fact equivalent to optimizing over state-
independent policies—i.e., those of the form pis,a = p˜ia,
where p˜i ∈ R|A|. Thus, we can apply a modified version of
Algorithm 2 where we only learn state-independent policies.
We also run a race-blind algorithm, which is unconstrained
but where pi ignores the sensitive attribute z ∈ Z. Note that
the optimal policy is race-blind, since the portion α, β of
the state is a sufficient statistic, so it captures all information
needed to determine whether to offer a loan.
Results. For demographic parity, Figure 1 (a) shows the
reward achieved for the bank, and (b) shows the value of the
fairness constraint—i.e., the smallest value of  for which
pi ∈ ΠDP,. As expected, race-blind achieves the highest re-
ward (10.43), followed by the optimistic algorithm (10.41),
and then Algorithm 2 (10.40). Finally, the conservative algo-
rithm performs substantially worse than the others (10.00).
However, race-blind achieves a very poor constraint value
(0.42), as does the optimistic algorithm (0.14), which per-
forms performs 43% worse than Algorithm 2 (0.10). The
conservative algorithm achieves constraint value 0.
For equal opportunity, Figure 1 (c) shows the bank reward,
and (d) shows the value of the constraint. The bank’s re-
wards are essentially the same for the race-blind algorithm,
optimistic algorithm, and Algorithm 2 (10.43), but is sub-
stantially worse for the conservative algorithm (10.00). As
with demographic parity, the constraint value for race-blind
(0.37) is substantially worse than the others, but in this case
optimistic (0.11) is fairly close to Algorithm 2 (0.10). The
conservative algorithm achieves constraint value 0.
Discussion. Our results show that imposing demographic
parity slightly reduces the bank’s reward, but substantially
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increases fairness compared to the race-blind and optimistic
algorithms. Recall that the optimistic algorithm models
supervised learning—thus, our results show the importance
of accounting for dynamics when ensuring fairness. We find
similar (but weaker) trends for equal opportunity. Like prior
work (Hardt et al., 2016), we find that demographic parity
reduces the bank’s rewards more than equal opportunity.
Unlike the static case (Hardt et al., 2016), our model has
dynamic parameters. Time series data would be needed to
estimate these parameters; instead, we choose them manu-
ally. Also, (Hardt et al., 2016) uses the empirical CDF of
the distribution over repayment probabilities p0 (whereas
we assumed p0 is a Beta distribution). However, our goal is
to understand the consequences of ignoring dynamics, not
to study a real-world scenario.
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A. Additional Fairness Properties
Equivalent of opportunity. The following fairness prop-
erty is based on the equality of opportunity fairness property
from (Hardt et al., 2016) for supervised learning.
Definition A.1. Let M be an MDP with state space of
the form S = Z × Y × S˜, where Z = {maj,min} and
Y = {qual, unqual}, and let ρ ∈ R|S|×|A| be the agent
rewards. Then, a policy pi satisfies equality of opportunity if
E
(s,a)∼Λ(pi)maj
[ρs,a] = E(s,a)∼Λ(pi)min [ρs,a],
where Λ(pi)z = Λ(pi) | ∃s˜ ∈ S˜ . s0 = (z, qual, s˜).
This property is similar to demographic parity, but restricted
to the qualified subpopulation—i.e., y = qual. For Mloan,
opportunity says that loans should be given to qualified ma-
jority and minority members at equal rates (we assume an
applicant is qualified if their true probability of repaying sat-
isfies p ≥ p0 for some p0 ∈ [0, 1]). In particular, the policy
can act arbitrarily for unqualified members y = unqual.
Path-specific causal fairness. We describe a causal no-
tion of fairness from (Nabi & Shpitser, 2018), which we
call path-specific causal fairness. We begin by giving back-
ground on causal graphs (Pearl, 2009). Our formulation
differs from the one in (Nabi & Shpitser, 2018), but we be-
lieve it make the notion of mediated intervention more clear
by isolating the source of randomness from the structural
equations.
Definition A.2. A causal domain is a set of indices V = [k],
where each index i ∈ V is associated with a random variable
i ∼ Pi, which we call a noise term, with domain Zi. We
use V =
[
1 ... n
]T ∼ PV to denote the vector of all
noise terms, and ZV to denote the domain of V .
Intuitively, a causal domain V indexes the set of variables
X1, ..., Xk of interest. In particular, these variables are
functions of the noise terms indexed by V .
Definition A.3. Given a causal domain V , a causal spec-
ification is a set of equations H = {h1, ..., hk}, where
hi : ZV → Xi for each i ∈ V .
Intuitively, a causal specification describes how to construct
the variables X1, ..., Xk given noise terms V , i.e., Xi =
hi(V ) for each i ∈ V . Typically, causal specifications
are constructed from structural equations associated with a
causal graph:
Definition A.4. Given a causal domain V , a causal graph
is a directed acyclic graph G = (V,E, F ), with ver-
tices V , edges E ⊆ V × V , and structural equations
F = {f1, ..., fk}, where
fi :
 ∏
(j,i)∈E
Xj
×Zi → Xi
for each i ∈ V . The corresponding causal specification is
HG, where hGi (V ) = Xi is the solution to
Xi = fi(pa(Xi), i),
where pa(Xi) = {Xj}(j,i)∈E are the parents of i; these
equations have a unique solution since G is acyclic.
Intuitively, the vertices of a causal graph represent variables
of interest, the edges represent dependence relationships
between these variables, and the structural equations fi
capture the causal dependences of Xi on pa(Xi).
Given a causal graph G, we can modify the structural equa-
tions to specify changes in the causal structure of G. A key
transformation is the following:
Definition A.5. Given causal graph G = (V,E, F ), in-
dex i ∈ V , and value x ∈ Xi, the intervention spec-
ification is the causal specification HG,do(Xi=x), where
h
G,do(Xi=x)
j (V ) = Xj is the solution to
Xj =
{
x if j = i
fj(pa(Xj), j) otherwise.
We call i the intervened variable.
In other words, HG,do(Xi=x) is computed replacing the pre-
vious value of Xi with a constant.
Definition A.6. Given causal graph G = (V,E, F ), in-
dices i, i′ ∈ V , and values x, x′ ∈ Xi, the medi-
ated intervention specification is the causal specification
HG,do(Xi=x),med(Xi′ ;Xi=x
′), where
h
G,do(Xi=x),med(Xi′ ;Xi=x
′)
j (V ) = Xj
is the solution to
Xj =

x if j = i
h
G,do(Xi=x′)
i′ (V ) if j = i
′
fj(pa(Xj), j) otherwise.
We call i′ the mediator variable.
This causal specification is essentially the same as
HG,do(Xi=x), except Xi′ is modified to equal its value ac-
cording to the intervention specification HG,do(Xi=x
′).
Now, we have the following fairness specification for super-
vised learning (Nabi & Shpitser, 2018):
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Definition A.7. Given causal graph G, indices i, i′ ∈ V ,
and values x, x′ ∈ Xi, a function φ :
∏n
i=1 Xi → Y satisfies
path-specific causal fairness if
Ep(V )[φ(~h
G,do(Xi=x),med(Xi′ ;Xi=x
′)(V ))] (15)
= Ep(V )[φ(~h
G,do(Xi=x′)(V ))].
We call Xi the sensitive attribute (where x represents the
majority subpopulation and x′ represents the minority sub-
population), Xi′ the mediated attribute, and Y the outcome.
This specification captures the idea that the outcome should
not change if we intervene on the sensitive attribute, except
we ignore the effect of this intervention on the mediated
attribute. For example, when a bank is deciding whether to
give a loan, it should not discriminate against an individual
based on their race (the sensitive attribute). However, they
are allowed to base their decisions on attributes such as
income (the mediated attribute), even if income is affected
by race. Even if their income is lower because of past
discrimination (e.g., they were unfairly denied a job in the
past due to their race), this specification says it is not the
responsibility of the bank to adjust for this discrepancy.
We have the following extension to the dynamical setting:
Definition A.8. Let M be an with states S = Z × Y × S˜,
and a causal graph G with vertices V = {Z, Y, S˜}. Then, a
policy pi : S → A satisfies path-specific causal fairness if
E
(s,a)∼Λ(pi)maj
[ρs,a] = EΛ(pi)min [ρs,a],
where Λ(pi)maj is Λ
(pi) conditioned on starting from initial state
s0 = ~h
G,do(Z=maj),med(Y ;Z=min)(V )
V ∼ p(V ),
and Λ(pi)min is Λ
(pi) conditioned on starting from initial state
s0 = ~h
G,do(Z=min)(V )
V ∼ p(V ).
Unlike unlike demographic parity and equailty of opportu-
nity, Λ(pi)maj and Λ
(pi)
min are asymmetric. We can impose symme-
try between the two subpopulations by imposing a second
constraint with maj and min swapped.
Finally, we can straightforwardly adapt both our model-
based and model-free reinforcement learning algorithms to
work with path-specific causal fairness, since it only affects
the initial state distribution. As with demographic parity
and equal opportunity, the model-based algorithm requires
separability to hold.
B. Proof of Theorem 2.5
For the first claim, consider the MDP M . The states are
s0, s1, s2, s3, s4 ∈ S˜ × Z, where:
s0 = (0,maj)
s1 = (1,maj)
s2 = (0,min)
s3 = (1,min)
s4 = (2,min).
The actions are A = {0, 1}. The transitions are
Ps0,a,s1 = 1
Ps1,a,s1 = 1
Ps2,a,s3 = I[a = 0]
Ps2,a,s4 = I[a = 1]
Ps3,s3 = 1
Ps4,s4 = 1
for all a ∈ A. The initial distribution is
Ds0 = Ds2 =
1
2
Ds1 = Ds3 = Ds4 = 0.
The discount factor is γ = 12 . The agent rewards are
ρs0,a = 0
ρs1,a = 1
ρs2,a = 0
ρs3,a = 0
ρs4,a = 2,
for all a ∈ A. Let pi : S → A be a deterministic policy.
It is clear that the only value of pi that matters is pi(s2).
Conditioned on z = maj, regardless of pi, the expected
cumulative agent reward is
E
(s,a)∼Λ(pi)maj
[ρs,a] =
(
1− 1
2
) ∞∑
t=1
1
2t
=
1
2
.
Conditioned on z = min, if pi(s2) = 0, then
E
(s,a)∼Λ(pi)min
[ρs,a] =
{
0 if pi(s2) = 0
1 if pi(s2) = 1.
Therefore, it is impossible for the demographic parity con-
straint to be satisfied.
However, consider the stochastic policy
pis2,0 = pis2,1 =
1
2
.
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Then,
E
(s,a)∼Λ(pi)min
[ρs,a] =
1
2
,
so this policy satisfies the demographic parity constraint.
For the second claim, consider the same MDP, except where
ρs4,a = 0
for all a ∈ A. Then, it is clear that
E
(s,a)∼Λ(pi)min
[ρs,a] = 0
regardless of pi. Thus, the demographic parity constraint
cannot be satisfied—i.e., ΠDP = 0.
C. Proof of Theorem 3.2
Our proof proceeds in three steps. First, we show that any
feasible point of the LP in Algorithm 1 is the state-action
distribution Λ(pi) for some policy pi ∈ ΠDP. Second, we
show that conversely, for any fair policy pi ∈ ΠDP, the state-
action distribution Λ(pi) is a feasible point of the LP. Finally,
we combine these two results to prove the theorem.
Step 1. Let pi ∈ ΠDP be any policy satisfying demographic
parity. Then, we claim that the state-action distribution Λ(pi)
is a feasible point of the LP in Algorithm 1.
First, we show that Λ(pi) satisfies the first constraint∑
a∈A
Λ
(pi)
s′,a = (1− γ)Ds′ + γ
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
Λ(pi)s,aPs,a,s′
for each s′ ∈ S.
To this end, note that by induction,
D(pi,t) = (P (pi))tD,
so
D(pi) = (1− γ)
[ ∞∑
t=0
(γP (pi))t
]
D. (16)
Multiplying each side of (16) by I − γP (pi) (where I is the
|S| × |S| identity matrix), we have
(I − γP (pi))D(pi)
= (1− γ)
[ ∞∑
t=0
(γP (pi))t −
∞∑
t=1
(γP (pi))t
]
D
= (1− γ) ·D.
Note that these algebraic manipulations are valid since the
eigenvalues of γP (pi) are bounded in norm by γ < 1, so all
sums converge absolutely. Rearranging this equality gives
D(pi) = (1− γ)D + γP (pi)D(pi). (17)
It follows that∑
a∈A
Λ
(pi)
s′,a = (1− γ)Ds′ + γ
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
Λ(pi)s,aPs,a,s′
for each s′ ∈ S, where we have used the equalities
D
(pi)
s′ =
∑
a∈A
Λ
(pi)
s′,a
and
(P (pi)D(pi))s′ =
∑
s∈S
P
(pi)
s,s′D
(pi)
s
=
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
Ps,a,s′pis,aD
(pi)
s
=
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
Ps,a,s′Λ
(pi)
s,a
that follow from the definition of Λ(pi). Therefore, Λ(pi)
satisfies the first constraint.
Next, we show that Λ(pi) satisfies the second constraint,
which says that there exists c ∈ R+ such that
p−1z
∑
s˜∈S˜
∑
a∈A
Λ
(pi)
(z,s˜),aρ(z,s˜),a = c
for all z ∈ Z .
In particular, note that
D(pi)z = D
(pi) | ∃s˜ ∈ S˜ . s = (zs˜),
since the value of z for s equals the value of z for the initial
state s0 ∼ D. Furthermore, the probability of sampling
s ∼ D(pi) | ∃s˜ ∈ S˜ . s = (z, s˜) is
D
(pi)
s I[∃s˜ ∈ S˜ . s = (z, s˜)]
pz
.
Together with the definition of Λ(pi)z , we have
(Λ(pi)z )s,a = (D
(pi)
z )spis,a
=
D
(pi)
s I[∃s˜ ∈ S˜ . s = (z, s˜)]
pz
· pis,a
=
Λ
(pi)
s,a I[∃s˜ ∈ S˜ . s = (z, s˜)]
pz
.
Therefore, we have
E
(s,a)∼Λ(pi)z [ρs,a] (18)
=
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
Λ
(pi)
s,a I[∃s˜ ∈ S˜ . s = (z, s˜)]
pz
· ρs,a
= p−1z
∑
s˜∈S˜
∑
a∈A
Λ(pi)s,aρs,a.
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By assumption, pi satisfies the demographic parity con-
straint, which says that (18) is constant for all z ∈ Z .
Equivalently, there exists c ∈ R+ such that (18) equals
c for all z ∈ Z . Thus, Λ(pi) satisfies the second constraint.
Therefore, Λ(pi) is a feasible point of the LP, as claimed.
Step 2. Let λ ∈ R|S|×|A| be a feasible point of the LP in
Algorithm 1, and let
pis,a =
λs,a∑
a′∈A λs,a′
be the corresponding policy returned by Algorithm 1. Then,
we claim that λ = Λ(pi), that pi ∈ ΠDP, and that the value of
the objective for λ equals R(pi).
To see the first claim, let d ∈ R|S| be defined by
ds =
∑
a∈A
λs,a.
We show that D(pi) = d. To this end, note that because λ
satisfies the first constraint in the LP, we have∑
a∈A
λs′,a = (1− γ)Ds′ + γ
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
λs,aPs,a,s′ .
Together with the equality
pis,a =
λs,a
ds
,
we have
ds′ = (1− γ)Ds′ + γ
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
dspis,aPs,a,s′
= (1− γ)Ds′ + γ(P (pi)d)s′ .
Thus,
d = (1− γ)D + γP (pi)d. (19)
We note that I − γP (pi) is invertible—in particular, the
eigenvalues of γP (pi) have norms bounded by γ, so the
eigenvalues of I − γP (pi) have norms bounded below by
1− γ; therefore, the eigenvalues of I − γP (pi) are nonzero,
so it is invertible. As a consequence, we can solve for d in
(19) to get
d = (1− γ)(I − γP (pi))−1D.
Finally, from (17) in Step 1 of this proof, we established
that D(pi) similarly satisfies
D(pi) = (1− γ)D + γP (pi)D(pi).
As before, since I − γP (pi) is invertible, we have
D(pi) = (1− γ)(I − γP (pi))−1D = d.
Thus,
λs,a = dspis,a = Dspis,a = Λ
(pi)
s,a ,
so the first claim follows.
To see the second claim, note that since λ is feasible, it must
satisfy the second constraint of the LP, which says that there
exists c ∈ R+ such that
p−1z
∑
s˜∈S˜
∑
a∈A
λ(z,s˜),aρ(z,s˜),a = c
for all z ∈ Z . Since λ = Λ(pi), the same holds true for Λ(pi),
i.e., there exists c ∈ R+ such that
p−1z
∑
s˜∈S˜
∑
a∈A
λ(z,s˜),aρ(z,s˜),a = c (20)
for all z ∈ Z . As shown in the first step of this proof, (20)
is equivalent to the demographic parity constraint. Thus,
pi ∈ ΠDP, as claimed.
To see the third claim, note that
R(pi) = (1− γ)E(s,a)∼Λ(pi) [Rs,a]
(1− γ)
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
Λ(pi)s,aRs,a.
In other words, the value of the objective of the LP for the
point λ is equal to R(pi), as claimed.
Step 3. Finally, we use the results from the previous two
steps to prove the theorem statement. First, let pi∗ be the
solution to (2). Then, by the claim shown in the first step,
Λ(pi
∗) is a feasible point of the LP in Algorithm 1. Further-
more, by the claim shown in the second step, the value of
the objective for λ = Λ(pi
∗) is R(pi
∗).
Next, let λ0 be the solution to the LP in Algorithm 1. By
the claim shown in the second step, (i) λ0 = Λ(pi0), where
pi0 is the policy returned by Algorithm 1, (ii) pi0 ∈ ΠDP, and
(iii) the value of the objective for λ0 is R(pi0).
It follows that R(pi
∗) ≤ R(pi0), since pi0 maximizes the ob-
jective of the LP over feasible points (and Λ(pi
∗) is feasible).
Since pi0 ∈ ΠDP, it follows that pi0 is also a solution to (2).
Thus, we have proven the theorem statement.
D. Proof of Theorem1 4.2 & 4.3
Our proof proceeds in four steps. First, we bound the error
|R˜(pi) −R(pi)| due to truncation. Second, we use Step 1 to
prove Theorem 4.2. Third, we bound the estimation error
|Rˆ(pi) − R˜(pi)|. Fourth, we combine steps 1 and 3 to prove
Theorem 4.3.
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Step 1. Note that for any policy pi, we have
|R˜(pi) −R(pi)| =
∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
t=T
γt〈R,Λ(pi,t)〉
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∞∑
t=T
γtRmax
≤ γ
TRmax
1− γ
≤ σ
2
4
.
Similarly, we have
|ρ˜(pi)z − ρ˜(pi)z | ≤
σ2
4
for all z ∈ Z.
Step 2. Now, we can prove Theorem 4.3. First, note that
|ρ(p˜i∗)maj − ρ(p˜i
∗)
min |
= |ρ(p˜i∗)maj − ρ˜(p˜i
∗)
maj |+ |ρ˜(p˜i
∗)
maj − ρ˜(p˜i
∗)
min |+ |ρ˜(p˜i
∗)
min − ρ(p˜i
∗)
min |
≤ σ
2
4
+ (1− σ)+ σ
2
4
≤ ,
so p˜i∗ ∈ ΠDP,, so the first claim. Similarly,
|ρ(pi∗)maj − ρ(pi
∗)
min |
= |ρ(pi∗)maj − ρ˜(pi
∗)
maj |+ |ρ˜(pi
∗)
maj − ρ˜(pi
∗)
min |+ |ρ˜(pi
∗)
min − ρ(pi
∗)
min |
≤ σ
2
4
+ (1− σ)2+ σ
2
4
≤ ,
since σ ≤ 12 ≤ 1− σ. So, pi∗ ∈ Π˜DP,(1−σ). Thus, we have
R(pi
∗) −R(p˜i∗)
≤ (R(pi∗) − R˜(pi∗)) + (R˜(pi∗) − R˜(p˜i∗)) + (R˜(p˜i∗) −R(p˜i∗))
≤ σ
2
4
+ 0 +
σ2
4
=
σ2
2
,
where the second inequality follows because p˜i∗ maximizes
R˜(pi) among policies pi ∈ Π˜DP,(1−σ). The second claim in
the theorem follows. Thus, the theorem statement follows.
Step 3. Note that Rˆ(pi) be an estimate of R˜(pi) using m
sampled rollouts ζ(1), ..., ζ(m). First, note that
|Rˆ(pi)| ≤ Rmax
1− γ
is bounded, so we can apply Hoeffding’s inequality (see
Lemma H.1) to get
Pr
[
|Rˆ(pi) − R˜(pi)| ≥ σ
4
]
≤ 2 exp
(
− mσ
22
32Rmax/(1− γ)
)
≤ δ
3
Similarly, for all z ∈ Z, we have
Pr
[
|ρˆ(pi)z − ρ˜(pi)z | ≥
σ
4
]
≤ δ
3
.
Since Z = {maj,min}, by a union bound,
|Rˆ(pi) − R˜(pi)| ≤ 
4
|ρˆ(pi)z − ρ˜(pi)z | ≤

4
(∀z ∈ Z)
with probability at least 1− δ.
Step 4. Now, we can prove Theorem 4.2. First, note that
with probability 1− δ,
|Rˆ(pi) −R(pi)| ≤ |Rˆ(pi) − R˜(pi)|+ |R˜(pi) −R(pi)|
≤ σ
4
+
σ2
4
≤ σ
2
,
as well as
|ρˆ(pi)z − ρ(pi)z | ≤
σ
2
for all z ∈ Z. The first claim follows. Next, note that
|ρmaj − ρmin|
≤ |ρmaj − ρˆmaj|+ |ρˆmaj − ρˆmin|+ |ρˆmin − ρmin|
≤ σ
2
+ (1− σ)+ σ
2
= ,
which implies that pi ∈ ΠDP,, so the second claim follows.
Thus, the theorem follows.
E. Proof of Theorem 5.2
Our proof proceeds in two steps. First, we prove that the
constraint in (14) is equivalent to (13). Second, we prove
that if pi satisfies (13), then pi ∈ ΠDP. The theorem statement
follows from these two claims, since they show that any
solution to (14) must satisfy demographic parity.
Step 1. We claim that (13) and the constraint in (14) are
equivalent.
Fairness with Dynamics
First, we show that the constraint in (14) implies (13). To
this end, let D′ ∈ ∆|S|. By the constraint in (14), there
exists c ∈ R+ such that for any z ∈ Z , we have
Es∼D′z
[∑
a∈A
pis,aρs,a
]
= Es∼D′z [c] = c.
Thus, (14) holds.
Second, we show that (13) implies (14). First, we show that
for any two states smaj = (maj, s˜) and smin = (min, s˜′), for
any s˜, s˜′ ∈ S˜, (13) implies that∑
a∈A
pismaj,aρsmaj,a =
∑
a∈A
pismin,aρsmin,a. (21)
To this end, let D′ ∈ ∆|S| be defined by
D′s =
1
2
δs,smaj +
1
2
δs,smin .
Then, note that
(D′z)s =
(D′s)I[∃s˜ ∈ S˜ . s = (z, s˜)]∑
s′∈S(D
′
s′I[∃s˜ ∈ S˜ . s′ = (z, s˜)])
=
(1/2)δs,sz
1/2
= δs,sz .
Thus,
Es∼D′z
[∑
a∈A
pis,aρs,a
]
=
∑
a∈A
pisz,aρsz,a,
so by (13), we have∑
a∈A
pismaj,aρsmaj,a =
∑
a∈A
pismin,aρsmin,a,
so we have shown that (21) holds. Next, we show that for
any two states s0, s1 ∈ S, (13) implies that∑
a∈A
pis0,aρs0,a =
∑
a∈A
pis1,aρs1,a. (22)
Note that (21) implies (22) when the sensitive attribute of s0
and s1 are different. Thus, it remains to show that (22) holds
when s0 and s1 have the same sensitive attribute. In this
case, let s2 be any state with a different sensitive attribute
than s0 and s1. Then, by (21), we have∑
a∈A
pis0,aρs0,a =
∑
a∈A
pis2,aρs2,a =
∑
a∈A
pis1,aρs1,a,
so (22) holds. Finally, note that (21) implies that∑
a∈A
pis,aρs,a
is constant for all s ∈ S. In other words, there exists c ∈ R+
such that ∑
a∈A
pis,aρs,a = c
for all s ∈ S. This statement is equivalent to the constraint
in (14), so (13) implies the constraint in (14).
Thus, (13) and the constraint in (14) are equivalent, so the
claim follows.
Step 2. We claim that if (13) holds for a policy pi, then
pi ∈ ΠDP. To this end, recall that the demographic parity
constraint is
E
(s,a)∼Λ(pi)maj
[ρs,a] = E(s,a)∼Λ(pi)min [ρs,a].
Note that for any z ∈ Z ,
E
(s,a)∼Λ(pi)z [ρs,a] =
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
(Λ(pi)z )s,aρs,a
=
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
(D(pi)z )spis,aρs,a
= E
s∼D(pi)z
[∑
a∈A
pis,aρs,a
]
.
Thus, the demographic parity constraint is equivalent to
E
s∼D(pi)maj
[∑
a∈A
pis,aρs,a
]
= E
s∼D(pi)min
[∑
a∈A
pis,aρs,a
]
,
which is exactly (13) for D′ = D(pi). The claim follows.
F. Proof of Theorem 6.4
Our proof proceeds in two steps. First, we prove that for any
policy pi, given two initial distributions D and D˜ satisfying
‖D − D˜‖∞ ≤ 0,
then
|R(pi) − R˜(pi)| ≤ |S| ·Rmax · 0
1− γ ,
where R(pi) (resp., R˜(pi)) is the expected cumulative distri-
bution assuming the initial distribution is D (resp., D˜), and
similarly for the agent rewards ρ. Second, we use this fact
to prove the theorem statement.
Step 1. We claim that assuming
‖D − D˜‖∞ ≤ 0,
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then for any policy pi, we have
|R(pi) − R˜(pi)| ≤ |S| ·Rmax · 0
1− γ ,
where R(pi) is the expected cumulative reward for pi in the
MDP M = (S,A,D, P,R, γ) and R˜(pi) is the expected cu-
mulative reward for pi in the MDP M˜ = (S,A, D˜, P,R, γ).
In addition, for all z ∈ Z, we have
|ρ(pi)z − ρ˜(pi)z | ≤
·|S| ·Rmax · 0
1− γ ,
where
ρ(pi)z = E(s,a)∼Λ(pi)z [ρs,a]
is the expected cumulative agent reward for the MDP M ,
and ρ˜(pi)z is the expected cumulative agent reward for the
MDP M˜ . We only prove the claim for |R(pi) − R˜(pi)|; the
claim for |ρ(pi)z − ρ˜(pi)z | follows using the same argument.
Let W ∈ R|S| be
Ws = 〈pis,·, Rs,·〉 =
∑
a∈A
pis,aRs,a.
Then, we have
R(pi) = (1− γ)〈R,Λ(pi)〉
= (1− γ)
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
D(pi)s pis,aRs,a
= (1− γ)〈D(pi),W 〉.
Now, note that
D(pi,t) = (P (pi))D,
so we have
D(pi) =
∞∑
t=0
γt
1− γD
(pi,t)
=
1
1− γ
[ ∞∑
t=0
(γP (pi))tD
]
.
Thus,
R(pi) =
∞∑
t=0
γt
〈
(P (pi))tD,W
〉
.
Similarly,
R˜(pi) =
∞∑
t=0
γt
〈
(P (pi))tD˜,W
〉
.
It follows that
R(pi) − R˜(pi) =
∞∑
t=0
γt
〈
(P (pi))tD − (P (pi))tD˜,W
〉
.
Thus,
|R(pi) − R˜(pi)|
≤
∞∑
t=0
γt‖(P (pi))tD − (P (pi))tD˜‖∞ · ‖W‖1
≤
∞∑
t=0
γt‖P (pi)‖t∞ · ‖D − D˜‖∞ · ‖W‖1, (23)
where the first line follows from Ho¨lder’s inequality and
the second line follows from properties of the matrix norm.
Note that
‖P (pi)‖∞ = max
s∈S
∑
s′∈S
|P (pi)s,s′ | = 1, (24)
since P (pi) is a stochastic matrix. Furthermore,
|Ws| = |〈pis,·, Rs,·〉| ≤ ‖pis,·‖1 · ‖Rs,·‖∞
≤ ‖Rs,·‖∞
≤ Rmax,
where the first inequality follows from Ho¨lder’s inequality
and the second inequality follows since pis,· is a discrete
probability distribution. Therefore,
‖W‖1 =
∑
s∈S
|Ws| ≤ |S| ·Rmax. (25)
Plugging (24) and (25) into (23) gives
|R(pi) − R˜(pi)| ≤ |S| ·Rmax · ‖D − D˜‖∞ ·
∞∑
t=0
γt
≤ |S| ·Rmax · 0
1− γ ,
as claimed.
Step 2. Now, we prove the theorem. Let p˜i be the optimal
policy for M˜ (i.e., initial distribution D˜ = d(pi0)) satisfying
p˜i ∈ Π˜DP,/2. Similarly, let p˜i∗ be the optimal policy for
M (i.e., initial distribution D = D(pi0,T0)) satisfying p˜i∗ ∈
ΠDP,/4. Here, T0 is the 0 mixing time of pi0 for
0 =
(1− γ)
8|S| ·Rmax .
Then, by definition of T0, we have
‖D˜ −D‖∞ ≤ 0.
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Thus, by the first step, for all z, z′ ∈ Z, we have
ρ(p˜i)z − ρ(p˜i)z′
≤ (ρ(p˜i)z − ρ˜(p˜i)z ) + (ρ˜(p˜i)z − ρ˜(p˜i)z′ ) + (ρ(p˜i)z′ − ρ˜(p˜i)z′ )
≤ |S| ·Rmax · 0
1− γ +

2
+
|S| ·Rmax · 0
1− γ
≤ ,
where the inequality on the third line follows because p˜i ∈
Π˜DP,/2. Thus, we guarantee that p˜i ∈ ΠDP,.
Next, note that similarly, for all z, z′ ∈ Z, we have
ρ˜(p˜i
∗)
z − ρ˜(p˜i
∗)
z′ ≤

2
,
so p˜i∗ ∈ Π˜DP,/2. As a consequence, we have
R(p˜i
∗) −R(p˜i)
= (R(p˜i
∗) − R˜(p˜i∗)) + (R˜(p˜i∗) − R˜(p˜i)) + (R˜(p˜i) −R(p˜i))
≤ |S| ·Rmax · 0
1− γ + 0 +
|S| ·Rmax · 0
1− γ
≤ ,
where the inequality on the third line follows because p˜i
maximizes R˜(pi) over pi ∈ Π˜DP,/2, and p˜i∗ ∈ Π˜DP,/2.
Thus, the theorem statement follows.
G. Proof of Theorem 6.1
Our proof proceeds in three steps. First, we prove that for
any 0, δ0, we can choose N0 sufficiently large so that
‖P − Pˆ‖∞ ≤ 0
with probability at least 1 − δ0. Second, we prove that
assuming ‖P − Pˆ‖∞ ≤ 0, then for any policy pi, we have
|R(pi) − Rˆ(pi)| ≤ T · |S| ·Rmax · 0,
whereR(pi) (resp., Rˆ(pi)) is the expected cumulative distribu-
tion assuming the transitions are P (resp., Pˆ ), and similarly
for the agent rewards ρ. Third, we use the first two steps to
prove the theorem statement.
Step 1. Given 0, δ0 ∈ R+, we claim that for
N0 =
2 log(2|S|2|A|/δ0)
λ20
2
0
,
then our estimate Pˆ satisfies
‖Pˆ − P‖∞ ≤ 0
with probability at least 1− δ0.
Let Is,a be the random variable indicating whether our al-
gorithm observes a tuple (s, a, s′) (for some s′ ∈ S) on a
single episode, and let Is,a,i be samples of Is,a for each of
the N0 exploratory episodes taken by our algorithm. Let
µ(I)s,a = E[Is,a]
µˆ(I)s,a =
1
N0
N0∑
i=1
Is,a,i.
Then, by Hoeffding’s inequality (see Lemma H.1), we have
Pr
[
|µˆ(I)s,a − µ(I)s,a| ≥ 
]
≤ 2e−2N02 . (26)
By assumption, we have
µ(I)s,a = Λ
(pi0)
s,a ≥ λ0,
so using  = λ0/2 in (26), we have
µˆ(I)s,a ≥
µ
(I)
s,a
2
≥ λ0
2
(27)
with probability at least
1− 2e−N0(µ(I)s,a)2/2 ≥ 1− 2e−N0λ20/2.
Taking a union bound over s ∈ S and a ∈ A, we have (27)
holds for every s ∈ S and a ∈ A with probability at least
1− 2|S| · |A| · e−N0λ20/2. (28)
In this event, we have at least N0λ02 observations (s, a, s
′)
(for some s′ ∈ S) for every s ∈ S and a ∈ A.
Now, for an observation (s, a, s′′), let Js,a,s′ be the random
variable indication whether s′ = s′′. Without loss of gener-
ality, we assume that we have exactly N1 = N0λ02 samples
Js,a,s′,j of Js,a,s′ for each s ∈ S and a ∈ A. Let
µ
(J)
s,a,s′ = E[Js,a,s′ ]
µˆ
(J)
s,a,s′ =
1
N1
N1∑
j=1
Js,a,s′,j .
Then, by Hoeffding’s inequality (see Lemma H.1), we have
Pr
[
|µˆ(J)s,a,s′ − µs,a,s′ | ≥ 
]
≤ 2e−2N12 . (29)
Note that by definition, µ(J)s,a,s′ = Ps,a,s′ and µˆ
(J)
s,a,s′ =
Pˆs,a,s′ . Thus, taking  = 0 in (29), we have
|Ps,a,s′ − Pˆs,a,s′ | ≤ 0 (30)
with probability at least
1− 2e−2N120 .
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Taking a union bound over all s, s′ ∈ S and a ∈ A, we have
(30) for all s, s′ ∈ S and a ∈ A with probability at least
1− 2|S|2|A| · e−2N120 . (31)
In other words, in this event, we have ‖P − Pˆ‖∞ ≤ 0.
Taking a union bound over (28) and (31), we have
‖P − Pˆ‖∞ ≤ 0
with probability at least
1− 2|S|2|A| · e−2N120 − 2|S| · |A| · e−N0λ20/2
= 1− 2|S|2|A| · e−N0λ020 − 2|S| · |A| · e−N0λ20/2
≥ 1− 2|S|2|A| · e−N0λ2020/2
= δ0,
as claimed.
Step 2. We claim that assuming
‖P − Pˆ‖∞ ≤ 0,
then for any policy pi, we have
|R(pi) − Rˆ(pi)| ≤ T · |S| ·Rmax · 0,
where R(pi) is the expected cumulative reward for pi in the
MDP M = (S,A,D, P,R, T ) and Rˆ(pi) is the expected cu-
mulative reward for pi in the MDP Mˆ = (S,A,D, Pˆ , R, T ).
Note that we have replaced the discount factor γ with the
time horizon T . In addition, for all z ∈ Z, we have
|ρ(pi)z − ρˆ(pi)z | ≤ T · |S| ·Rmax · 0,
where
ρ(pi)z = E(s,a)∼Λ(pi)z [ρs,a],
is the expected cumulative agent reward for the MDP M ,
and ρˆ(pi)z is the expected cumulative agent reward for the
MDP Mˆ . We only prove the claim for |R(pi) − Rˆ(pi)|; the
claim for |ρ(pi)z − ρˆ(pi)z | follows using the same argument.
Let W ∈ R|S| be
Ws = 〈pis,·, Rs,·〉 =
∑
a∈A
pis,aRs,a.
Then, we have
R(pi) = 〈R,Λ(pi)〉
=
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
D(pi)s pis,aRs,a
= 〈D(pi),W 〉.
Now, note that
D(pi,t) = (P (pi))D,
so we have
D(pi) =
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
D(pi,t)
=
1
T
[
T−1∑
t=0
(P (pi))tD
]
.
Thus,
R(pi) =
T−1∑
t=0
〈
(P (pi))tD,W
〉
.
Similarly,
Rˆ(pi) =
T−1∑
t=0
〈
(Pˆ (pi))tD,W
〉
.
It follows that
R(pi) − Rˆ(pi) =
T−1∑
t=0
〈
(P (pi))tD − (Pˆ (pi))tD,W
〉
.
Thus,
|R(pi) − Rˆ(pi)|
≤
T−1∑
t=0
‖(P (pi))tD − (Pˆ (pi))tD‖∞ · ‖W‖1
≤
T−1∑
t=1
‖P (pi) − Pˆ (pi)‖t∞ · ‖D‖∞ · ‖W‖1, (32)
where the first line follows from Ho¨lder’s inequality and
the second line follows from properties of the matrix norm.
Also, in the second line, we have used the fact that the
summand is zero for t = 0 since (P (pi))0 = (Pˆ (pi))0 = I .
Note that
‖D‖∞ ≤ 1 (33)
Furthermore,
|Ws| = |〈pis,·, Rs,·〉| ≤ ‖pis,·‖1 · ‖Rs,·‖∞
≤ ‖Rs,·‖∞
≤ Rmax,
where the first inequality follows from Ho¨lder’s inequality
and the second inequality follows since pis,· is a discrete
probability distribution. Therefore,
‖W‖1 =
∑
s∈S
|Ws| ≤ |S| ·Rmax. (34)
Fairness with Dynamics
Plugging (33) and (34) into (32) gives
|R(pi) − Rˆ(pi)| ≤ |S| ·Rmax ·
T−1∑
t=1
t0
≤ T · |S| ·Rmax · 0.
Step 3. Now, we prove the theorem. Let pˆi be the optimal
policy for Mˆ (i.e., transitions Pˆ ) satisfying pˆi ∈ ΠˆDP,/2.
Similarly, let pi∗ be the optimal policy forM (i.e., transitions
P ) satisfying pi∗ ∈ ΠDP,/4. We apply the second step with
0 =

8T · |S| ·Rmax
δ0 = δ.
Then, by the first step, for all z, z′ ∈ Z, we have
ρ(pˆi)z − ρ(pˆi)z′
≤ (ρ(pˆi)z − ρˆ(pˆi)z ) + (ρˆ(pˆi)z − ρˆ(pˆi)z′ ) + +(ρ(pˆi)z′ − ρˆ(pˆi)z′ )
≤ T · |S| ·Rmax · 0 + 
2
+ T · |S| ·Rmax · 0
≤ ,
where the inequality on the third line follows because pˆi ∈
ΠˆDP,/2. Thus, we guarantee that pˆi ∈ ΠDP,.
Next, note that similarly, for all z, z′ ∈ Z, we have
ρˆ(pi
∗)
z − ρˆ(pi
∗)
z′ ≤

2
,
so pi∗ ∈ ΠˆDP,/2. As a consequence, we have
R(pi
∗) −R(pˆi)
= (R(pi
∗) − Rˆ(pi∗)) + (Rˆ(pi∗) − Rˆ(pˆi)) + (Rˆ(pˆi) −R(pˆi))
≤ T · |S| ·Rmax · 0 + 0 + T · |S| ·Rmax · 0
≤ ,
where the inequality on the third line follows because pˆi
maximizes Rˆ(pi) over pi ∈ ΠˆDP,/2, and pi∗ ∈ ΠˆDP,/2.
Thus, the theorem statement follows.
H. Technical Lemmas
Lemma H.1. (Hoeffding’s inequality) Let X ∼ pX be a
random variable with domain [a, b] ⊆ R and mean µX , and
let µˆX = n−1
∑n
i=1Xi be an estimate of µX a using n
i.i.d. samples Xi ∼ pX . Then, we have
Pr [|µˆX − µX | ≥ ] ≤ 2 exp
(
− 2n
2
(b− a)2
)
, (35)
where the probability is taken over the randomness in the
i.i.d. samples X1, ..., Xn ∼ pX .
Proof. See (Wainwright, 2019) for a proof.
I. Experiment Parameters
We use the following parameters for our loan MDP:
I = 0.17318629
pZ = 0.29294318
αmaj = 0.65338681
βmaj = 0.20783559
αmin = 0.48824268
βmin = 0.48346869
λ = 0.01
τ = 0.1
 = 0.1
T = 50
Tmaj = 10
Tmin = 7.
